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Abstract
John Maynard Keynes claimed that not all probabilities were comparable. Frank Ramsey argued
that they were, and that Keynes’s views to the contrary rested on a confusion of degree of entailment
and degree of belief. We will argue that Keynes and Ramsey largely talked past each other, and yet
that there are issues of great significance underlying their dispute. In particular, the simple principle
of maximizing expected utility may be seen in a new light as one step of a rich and complex process.
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1. Keynes
1.1. Probability is a logical relation
Keynes is unequivocal in his insistence that probability represents a logical relation that
is objective. “. . . in the sense important to logic, probability is not subjective. It is not,
that is to say, subject to human caprice. A proposition is not probable because we think
it so. When once the facts are given which determine our knowledge, what is probable or
improbable in these circumstances has been fixed objectively, and is independent of our
opinion. The Theory of Probability is logical, therefore, because it is concerned with the
degree of belief which it is rational to entertain in given conditions, and not merely with
the actual beliefs of particular individuals, which may or may not be rational” [5, p. 4].
Having thus laid his cards on the table, Keynes at no point backs down. “When we ar-
gue that Darwin gives valid grounds for our accepting his theory of natural selection, we
do not simply mean that we are psychologically inclined to agree with him; it is certain
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that we also intend to convey our belief that we are acting rationally in regarding his the-
ory as probable. We believe that there is some real objective relation between Darwin’s
evidence and his conclusions . . . ” [5, p. 5]. Keynes was influenced by Moore as well as
Russell; he finds nothing disquieting about supposing that these probability relations are
yielded by direct intuition of “secondary” propositions. Ramsey denies having any such
intuitions, and argues instead for a behavioral interpretation of “degrees of belief” that has
the consequence that probabilities or degrees of belief can be measured by real (actually, by
rational numbers. Ramsey then goes on to present arguments for these numbers satisfying
the conventional probability calculus.
1.2. Probability values
Although Keynes speaks repeatedly of “degrees” of rational belief, and acknowledges
that to speak thus implies that degrees of belief are in some sense quantitative and “per-
haps capable of measurement,” he ends up by denying, in Chapter III, that all probabilities
are even capable of comparison. In considering arguments in favor of the measurability of
probabilities, Keynes (interestingly, vis a vis Ramsey) cites the practise of underwriters of
insuring against almost any eventuality. “But this practice shows no more than that many
probabilities are greater or less that some numerical measure, not that they themselves are
numerically definite” [5, p. 22]. Keynes maintains “. . . that there are some pairs of proba-
bilities between the members of which no comparison of magnitude is possible . . . [nor is
it] always possible to say that the degree of our rational belief in one conclusion is either
equal to, greater than, or less than our degree of belief in another” [5, p. 34]. “. . . the closest
analogy is that of similarity” [5, p. 36] This suggests, as does the illustration in [5, p. 39]
and reproduced in slightly altered form in Fig. 1, that probabilities form a lattice structure.
• All probabilities are between 0 and 1.
• Some probabilities (Z and V,A and Y, . . .) are not comparable.
• Probabilities fall on paths.
• One probability Z is less than another probability Y if it lies on a path between 0
and Y .
• A probability may belong to more than one path (W ).
Fig. 1. Probability structures.
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These probabilities do not satisfy the conditions for quantities; they are not magnitudes
in the sense of lengths or masses. But they make sense! Here is model making use of
two-vectors, though any multi-dimensional vector space would suffice.
• Construe probabilities as subintervals of [0,1].
• Take one probability interval to be less than another just in case every point in the first
interval is less than any point in the second interval.
• When there is a point in one interval that is not in the other, and vice versa, we take
the intervals to be incomparable.
• When every point of one interval is included in another interval, we take the intervals
to be incomparable.
• Allow degenerate intervals.1
We now have a perfectly well behaved lattice structure. The set of subintervals of [0,1]
does form a lattice under the natural ordering [p,q] [r, s] if and only if every point in
[p,q] is less than any point in [r, s]. The meet of [p,q] and [r, s] is just the degenerate in-
terval [min{r,p},min{r,p}], and the join is the degenerate interval [max{s, q},max{s, q}].
On this interpretation of the values of probability we have no difficulty in accommodating
Keynes’s graph. Furthermore, to the extent that probabilities are based on our knowledge of
frequencies—and surely some probabilities are so based—it is natural to suppose that they
are often interval valued, since our knowledge of frequencies is inevitably approximate.
In any event, it is clear that we can find a set of objects that has the structure that Keynes
assigned to probabilities, and that this structure is consistent and coherent. What is curious
is that the mathematician/philosopher, Frank Ramsey, paid no attention to this structure
in his review of the Treatise, [14], though he did attack the claims that some probabilities
were incomparable, and that some were non-numerical. One writer who did take Keynes’s
view of seriously was Koopman [6–8]. Koopman showed that if we focus on subsets of
probabilities that can be approximated by a numerical net, as can the probabilities gener-
ated by well tuned gambling apparatus, then the standard numerical calculus of probability
can be obtained as a limiting approximation.
2. Ramsey on Keynes
Ramsey’s main critique of Keynes’s view of probability as set forth in the Treatise as
it was finally published, as well as the development of his own views, appears in The
Foundations of Mathematics as the long chapter on “Truth and Probability”. Here Ramsey
does take note of the fact that Keynes holds that probabilities are not always expressible by
numbers, but “. . . only that there is a one-one correspondence between probability relations
and the degrees of belief which they justify” [15, pp. 160–161]. This renders the manifold
of probabilities similar (in the technical sense) to the manifold of degrees of belief. This,
remarks Ramsey, should have “. . . provided quite as worthy material for his skepticism as
1 This is the view of probability adopted in [10] and developed most clearly in [9].
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did the numerical measurement of probability relations” [15, p. 161]. This is an odd thing
to say, since it is apparently Keynes’s intuitions about rational belief that lead him to this
view about probability, rather than vice versa. Ramsey’s serious criticisms fall into two
areas. Once concerns the measurement of belief, and one the force of logic.
2.1. The measurement of belief
Keynes takes probability to be “legislative” for rational belief. This makes sense only
if we can compare elements from the manifold of beliefs to elements of the probability
manifold. “The subject of our inquiry is the logic of partial belief, and I do not think we
can carry it far unless we have at least an approximate notion of what partial belief is, and
how, if at all, it can be measured. . . . It is not enough to measure probability; in order to ap-
portion correctly our belief to the probability we must also be able to measure our belief”
[15, p. 166]. Note that here, at the beginning of this section, Ramsey has already committed
himself, without visible argument, to the falsity of Keynes’s view that “degrees” of belief
are no more than partially ordered. Ramsey has now set himself the problem of “measur-
ing” degrees of belief. He sets about it in a strictly behavioristic way: my degree of belief
in a proposition can be measured by its causal efficacy in making decisions. “. . . this way
of measuring beliefs . . . allows validity to betting as a means of measuring beliefs” [15,
p. 176]. This may provide an “approximate” notion of partial belief, but there is nothing
approximate about the corresponding notion of degree. There is exactly one real number,
on Ramsey’s construction, that corresponds to the odds at which the agent would be willing
to accept a bet either on or against a given proposition. This measurement procedure begs
the question against Keynes’s claim that the manifold of probabilities is richer than the set
of real numbers between 0 and 1. Leaving that issue to one side, there are two objections to
the claim that the person whose degrees of belief are not “coherent” (i.e., do not satisfy the
axioms of probability) will be in a position to have a sure-loss book made against him. First
of all, whatever the agent’s degrees of belief may be, it requires only prowess in deduction
for him to decline to commit himself to a sure loss. I may believe in heads to the degree 2/3
and in tails to the degree 2/3; on Ramsey’s behavioristic view this means that I am willing
to offer 2 : 1 odds on tails, and also willing to offer 2 : 1 odds on heads. But unless I am very
confused about the nature of coins, or deductively incompetent, I will decline to make both
bets simultaneously. It is a matter of deduction, not partial belief or probability, to note that
the final bet of the group that entails sure loss does entail sure loss. Many people, subjec-
tivists and Bayesians among them, reject the Dutch Book Argument. The second objection
is that this question of measuring beliefs is off the mark in two ways. First of all, since Key-
nes’ probabilities are not real valued, it is not clear what sort of “measurement” is involved
in assessing a fit between an agent’s epistemic state and the probability he ought, given his
evidence, assign to the proposition S. Second, the question is orthogonal to Keynes’s thesis.
Keynesian probabilities measure the force of evidence, and determine the right doxastic at-
titude to have toward a proposition S, given background knowledge and evidence K . This
could be an interesting thesis, absent any method of determining directly whether a person
whose background knowledge and evidence is K actually has the prescribed doxastic at-
titude toward S. It could be both useful and interesting, even if we had only a very crude
way of determining an individual’s doxastic state. Nevertheless, Ramsey’s questions have
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set the agenda for the important movement of Bayesianism. While few scholars would en-
dorse a naively behavioristic view of belief, the idea that there are real-valued degrees of
belief is fundamental to Bayesianism. We shall explore the consequences of doubting their
existence later.
2.2. The force of logic
Ramsey’s attack on Keynes’s view of probability as a logical relation is two pronged.
First he cannot “. . . see what these inconclusive logical relations can be or how they can
justify partial beliefs” [15, p. 185]. Second, he offers his own view of the relation between
logic and the probability calculus. Now it is all very well for Ramsey modestly to admit that
he sees no logical relation of probability such as that Keynes seeks to draw our attention
to, but it is clear that Ramsey wants to go further than that. Ramsey wants to claim that
there is no such relation; but of course it is hard to offer an argument for such a negative
view. (“Prove that there is no lion in the garden!”) Ramsey agrees, however, that there
is a connection between logic and the laws of probability “. . . which we have proved to
be necessarily true of any consistent set of degrees or belief” [15, p. 182]. This certainly
sounds like logic, although the gloss, “If anyone’s mental condition violated these laws,
. . . [h]e could have a book made against him by a cunning better and would then stand to
lose in any event” [15, p. 182]. Is purely pragmatic in tone. One might instead take the
relations captured by the probability calculus as simply embodying a kind of logic. This
is the view of such writers as Halpern [2] in computer science and Morgan [12,13] and
Howson [3] in philosophy. Ramsey takes the conclusion of a formally valid argument to
be “contained in the premises” so that to accept the premises and reject the conclusion
is inconsistent. But “[w]e could accept the premises and utterly reject the conclusion of
[of an inductive argument] without any sort of inconsistency or contradiction”. The most
telling quotation is this: “In short, . . . we do not regard it as belonging to formal logic to
say what should be a man’s expectation of drawing a white or a black ball from an urn; his
original expectations may within the limits of consistency be any he likes; all we have to
point out is that if he has certain expectations he is bound in consistency to have certain
others. This is simply bringing probability into line with ordinary formal logic, which
does not criticize premises but merely declares that certain conclusions are the only ones
consistent with them” [15, p. 189]. To be sure, the context is a discussion of the principle
of indifference, required, according to Ramsey, to obtain initial probabilities. But although
Keynes gives a cool defense of some applications of this principle, he hardly needs it. Given
the manifold of probabilities that he defends there is no reason that the rational expectation
of drawing a white ball, in a circumstance of no information, should have a real value at all,
or that it should not be maximally indeterminate—what we would represent by the whole
interval [0,1]. Furthermore, if a man’s initial expectation may be any he likes, he is surely
free to adopt that initial expectation that leads to whatever expectation conditioned on the
evidence he wants. P(h|e)= (P (h ∧ e)/[P(h∧ e)+ P(¬h ∧ e)], so by manipulating the
two absolute probabilities in the denominator we can make the conditional probability have
any value we want. One can no more admit a little subjectivity into these matters than one
can be a little bit pregnant. Though Ramsey’s view of uncertain inference is echoed today,
e.g., by Halpern [2] and Morgan [12,13], it depends on exactly that complete ordering
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of the probability manifold that Keynes (and Smith, and many others) was at pains to
deny. Perhaps a man’s rational expectation of drawing a black or a white ball is wholly
indeterminate: the whole interval [0,1], or more generally, on Keynes’s view, a member
of the manifold that is directly comparable only to 0 and 1. To be sure, this does not
solve the problem of induction—but Keynes was very skeptical of any mechanical solution
to that problem—for if the initial probability is wholly indeterminate any application of
Bayes’ theorem will leave the conditioned probability wholly indeterminate as well. Did
Keynes bow to Ramsey’s criticism, as many think? I do not believe so: “ . . . in attempting
to distinguish ‘rational’ degrees of belief from belief in general he [Ramsey] was not yet, I
think, quite successful” [4, p. 339]. This is not throwing in the towel.
3. Partial entailment
Ramsey despaired of making sense out of “partial entailment” but as we have seen he
was fully committed to taking probability and degree of belief to be real valued. The only
path that assumes that given a set of sentences (as evidence) and a sentence there is just
one real number that measures the degree to which the former entails the latter follows
the trail blazed so thoroughly by Carnap [1]—and as even Carnap came to realize, that
trail ends in a swamp. How can you sensibly expect to find a real number that measures
precisely the degree to which “Charles is a frog” entails “Alice is capable of flight?” Given
Keynes’s rich manifold of probabilities and degrees of belief, however, it turns out that we
can give an account of partial entailment. We cannot do so on the basis of Keynes’s vague
references to “intuition” but require more in the way of semantics. We begin with some
natural assumptions:
• We do know some approximate relative frequencies.
• Probabilities should reflect relative frequencies.
• Statements we know to have the same truth value should have the same probability.
Entailment in First Order Logic can be taken as requiring that every model of the premises
is a model of the conclusion. In a similar way, we can take partial entailment as requiring
that some fraction of the models of the premises are models of the conclusion. If we require
that this fraction is unique, we are back on Carnap’s garden path. If we require that this
principle apply to all the models of all the premises, we are also in trouble. Suppose one
of the premises is that between p and q of the R’s are T ’s. Clearly every model of the
premises must satisfy the condition that the ratio of the cardinality of the interpretation of
R ∩ T to the cardinality of the interpretation of R must fall in the range [p,q]. In real life
there are many such things we know and can take as premises. We could consider
• The frequency with which tossed coins in general land heads (very close to a half),
• The frequency with which quarters land heads (fairly close to a half),
• The frequency with which the tosser achieves heads (an even wider interval), and
• The frequency with which the next toss lands heads (the interval [0,1], since that toss
will either land heads or tails).
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In order to proceed, we must sort out the problem of the reference class. Suppose we
know “a ∈ T ≡ b ∈ U”, “a ∈ R”, and “b ∈ S”. Suppose that in every model of our body
of knowledge, the tightest interval capturing the proportion of R that are T is [p,q], and
that in every model the tightest interval capturing the proportion of S that are U is [u,v].
Suppose that [u,v] differs from [p,q] if and only if neither interval is included in the other.
Surprisingly, there are only three grounds for ignoring the known frequency [u,v] among
the other intervals known to characterize potential reference classes.
(1) [u,v] differs from [p,q] and the distribution in R is multidimensional, and one of
those dimensions is S.2
Example. A ball is selected from an urn that is in turn selected from a set of urns. The
overall proportion of black balls can be disregarded in favor of the weighted proportion. If
conditioning can be based on objective knowledge, use it.
(2) [u,v] differs from [p,q] and R is known to be a subset of S.3
Example. If we know a penguin was the kind of bird chosen, we should use the proportion
of penguins that fly as a guide to our expectation of flight, rather than the proportion of
birds in general.
(3) [u,v] includes all of the intervals that survive constraints (1) and (2).
Example. We have statistical evidence that enables us to infer that Mary tosses heads be-
tween 0.4 and 0.6 of the time. But all our other evidence clusters within 0.48 and 0.52. We
legitimately ignore what we know about Mary.4 These three principles lead to a unique in-
terval representing the degree to which a body of knowledge “partially entails” a statement.
When the lower bound of this interval is close to 1.0 (where “close” means something con-
crete, like 0.05 or 0.01) there are grounds for accepting the statement; here we leave the
epistemological questions raised by this suggestion to one side. From a semantic point
of view partial entailment may involve intervals bounded toward 0.0 as well as bounded
toward 1.0, and any interval in between. The phrase “partial entailment” is validated by
the fact that the corresponding frequency with which the statement is true in the relevant
models of our data and background knowledge are models in which our conclusion is true
(see Fig. 2). But what are the relevant models? All our statistical knowledge is represented,
save that which there are grounds for excluding, as prescribed by the three principles stated
earlier. Thus consider the triple of sentences, “S ≡ a ∈ T ”, “a ∈ R” and “the proportion
of R that is in T lies between p and q”. We consider as relevant the models of any such
2 This corresponds to the legitimate Bayesian case. Even the founding fathers of frequentist statistics never
doubted that if you had a prior distribution, you should condition on the evidence.
3 This corresponds to the well known and universally loved principle of specificity.
4 This is the principle of strength discussed in [10] and most recently [9]. It has not been much discussed in
either the philosophical or the statistical literature, because it makes no sense at all if probabilities are taken to be
real valued.
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triple in which the frequency [p,q] is not to be ignored. The set of models of our whole
knowledge base is a subset, of course, of any such set of models. Furthermore, there may
be a number of such sets of models, corresponding to uneliminated reference classes. In
the picture, A, S, and R represent three such sets of models, and B represents the models
of our background knowledge. If we look at the whole set of models (the union of A, S,
and R in our example), we can see that the proportion of models in which the sentence S is
true is necessarily between the lowest bound and highest bound in the individual models.
This fact, we claim, makes the expression “partial entailment” appropriate.
4. Are there degrees of belief?
What has all this to do with degrees of belief? As Keynes said,
• Probability represents a logical relation between a statement S and sets of statements
constituting our evidence.
• It reflects the logical support given S by that evidence.
• It is “legislative for rational belief” in two senses:
(1) Given a body of evidence, high probability relative to that evidence warrants ac-
ceptance (qualitative belief) in a sense indexed by a tolerance for error ε. “Darwin
gives valid grounds for our accepting his theory of natural selection . . . there is
some real objective relation between Darwin’s evidence and his conclusions . . . ”
[5, p. 5].
(2) Given a body of evidence, probability intervals relative to that evidence rationally
demand corresponding beliefs. Given the evidence that 40–50% of the balls drawn
from this urn are black, our expectation “of drawing a black ball” logically should
be [0.4,0.5].
The same structure that supports qualitative belief (corrigible acceptance) also supports
partial belief. Qualitative belief:
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We have a parallel to deductive validity. It is weaker, because it must be nonmonotonic.
We accept a “probable” conclusion because it is very unlikely to be wrong. But we do
accept it; we believe it in the qualitative sense, though we simultaneously recognize that
it is corrigible. We do not bet against it. But new evidence can undo what past evidence
has wrought.
Quantitative belief:
In the case of partial belief, we do not fully commit, even tentatively. We are willing to
bet against S (for the right odds). New evidence can alter partial belief.
We do not want to speak of “degrees of belief” in connection with qualitative beliefs, even
though they are corrigible. We are not prepared to bet against them. Should we speak of
partial beliefs as “degrees of belief”? Although probabilities are intervals, we could still
do so. Or we could say that any “degree of belief” satisfying the probability bounds was
“rational”. But what would be the point of doing so? We agree with Ramsey that logic
cannot determine a real-valued a priori degree of belief in pulling a black ball from an urn.
This seems a case where degrees of belief are not appropriate. No particular degree of be-
lief is defensible. We deny that there are any appropriate a priori degrees of belief, though
there is a fine a priori probability: [0,1]. There are real valued bounds on degrees of belief,
determined by the logical structure of our evidence. Often, of course, this structure is mul-
tidimensional, and we obtain these bounds by conditioning. We can have good empirical
grounds for accepting (qualitatively believing) a joint distribution, and conditioning on an
observation. If you want to call the corresponding intervals themselves “degrees” that’s
fine; but they are not degrees in the sense that they have real or rational values. They are
not quantities, though they have quantitative bounds. One might find a use for degrees of
belief in hypothetical cases: If one knew that the proportion of tosses of coins that yield
heads, over the life of the universe, was precisely 0.500 . . . , and one had no conflicting
evidence concerning the next toss, then one would be obliged to have a degree of belief
equal to a half in heads on the next toss. But it is not clear what use these hypothetical
cases are; they do not occur in real life. Therefore I see no reason to suppose that people,
situated in real life, ever have “degrees of belief”. I am happy to claim that there are no
degrees of belief.
5. What is a Bayesian?
Nobody denies that Bayes’ theorem is a theorem. If this is all it takes to be a Bayesian,
then we are all Bayesians. But then the term is useless; it marks no distinction. Nor does
anyone of sense doubt the usefulness of Bayes’ theorem when it can be applied. What dis-
tinguishes the Bayesian is that he thinks it can always be applied, and others think that it
can be applied only when there are grounds for accepting an approximate joint distribution.
A Bayesian is one who thinks we always have a joint distribution. Since it is clear that we
cannot have empirical grounds for assigning a joint frequency probability over everything,
the Bayesian must make up for that lack by sheer imagination; the Bayesian response is
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that everybody has to arrive at probabilities by exercising imagination. Keynes would deny
this. Classical statisticians would deny this. The case for the Bayesian response has not yet
been made. One area in which it seems that an interval approach is awkward and in which
Bayesianism seems admirably suited is decision theory. If there are degrees of belief, then
there are point valued expectations of actions, and the principle of maximizing expected
utility applies universally. If probabilities are interval valued, then expectations must be
interval valued as well, and it is not obvious how you weigh intervals of expected value
against each other. Only one principle stands out, the principle of dominance: if all the
points of one interval lie above any point in the other, the first interval should be preferred.
But this hardly yields the complete prescription for decision theory that follows from the
assumption of degrees of belief. Various supplements have been proposed. We could seek
to maximize the maximum expected gain. We could rank intervals by their midpoints. We
could rank them by their minimum expectation (this is known as the gamma maximin
principle). We could take the ranking to be “subjective”. Two points may be made. One is
that, from a Bayesian point of view, given the derivation of degrees of belief from choice
behavior, it is questionable whether decision theory adds anything in the way of guidance
that is not already built into the measurement of belief. This point has been developed in
[11], and will not be further developed here. The other point is that objective rational stan-
dards may take us only so far. Once we have eliminated the dominated options, we may
have gone as far as rationality can take us. But of course this is speculation, and rather
negative speculation at that. It is also possible that this is far as prudential considerations
take us, and that other considerations must be called on to take up part of the slack. For
example, under many circumstances (health emergency, fire, warfare) speed of decision is
of the essence: which decision (among the undominated) can we execute the fastest. Econ-
omy of intellectual effort may be relevant: Perhaps we could come to better decision if
we undertook a long longitudinal study; but perhaps this is not worth the effort. Perhaps
some sets of acts can be ranked by their moral worth, or their intrinsic properties, or their
dramatic qualities. Of course part of the slack could also be taken up with natural human
variation or whimsey, for example, pessimism or optimism. One interesting possibility is
that what we have here is room for intuitive judgment. By this I mean that the consider-
ations we have dealt with so far are primarily linguistic in character—they represent the
kinds of things that can be put in formal arguments, and represented in a computer. But
there are other factors that can bear on our choices. Some people in a given domain simply
make better decisions than others. The brilliant diagnostician may not be able to articulate
his reasons for a diagnosis, yet he may frequently be right.5 He may not be able to teach
his skill, other than by example. In some cases, however, it may be possible to enrich the
language with new predicates and relations in such a way that the enriched language can
represent these decisions as rational. There is no reason to think that this is always the
case. Perhaps we should take seriously Pascal’s saying. “The heart hath its reasons which
reason knows nothing of . . . .” But, possibly at variance with Pascal’s intent, this handy
saying cannot override the bounds of rational decision. If act A is dominated by another
5 Knowing this, it may be rational for us to treat the diagnostician as a “reliable instrument” but he cannot so
treat himself without bending logic.
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act, intuition cannot reverse their relation. We may thus avoid the flabbiness of extreme
empiricism that suggests that, so long as experience is honored, one person’s theoretical
view is as good as another’s, and at the same time pay due homage to Pascal’s insight.
The upshot of our investigation is that the assumption that degrees of belief exist is not an
innocuous idealizing assumption of convenience, but an assumption that carries weighty
philosophical consequences. In particular, this assumption obscures an important part of
the structure of “partial” belief, and makes it difficult to understand the possibility of “par-
tial entailment”. To be sure, some of the difficulty stems from the fact that the notion of
partial belief serves two functions: it serves to impose constraints on behavior in the face
of uncertainty, and it also serves to impose constraints on qualitative belief. Partial beliefs
on the pattern of Keynes’ have their drawbacks, compared to Ramsey’s degrees of belief,
but it can be argued that these drawbacks—the added complexity of decision theory, the
difficulties of taking qualitative belief into account, the nonstandard structure of qualitative
beliefs—represent important dimensions of human rationality that deserve to be explored
rather than ignored or hidden. Thus although it is not absurd to propose that statements
are believed to real-valued degrees, Keynes was quite right when he said “. . . in attempting
to distinguish ‘rational’ degrees of belief from belief in general he was not yet, I think,
quite successful”. [4, p. 339] I think Keynes could have gone further, and said that in re-
stricting ourselves to real valued degrees of belief we have precluded making sense of the
distinction between objectively rationality and arbitrary but consistent subjectivity, and in
decision theory excluded the exogenous treatment of human judgment.
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